Offshore Petroleum Facility Incidents Post Varanus Island, Montara, and Macondo: Have We Really Addressed the Root Cause? by Hunter, Tina
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 2
Offshore Petroleum Facility Incidents Post Varanus
Island, Montara, and Macondo: Have We Really
Addressed the Root Cause?
Tina Hunter
Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Tina Hunter, Offshore Petroleum Facility Incidents Post Varanus Island, Montara, and Macondo: Have
We Really Addressed the Root Cause?, 38 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 585 (2014),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol38/iss3/2
OFFSHORE PETROLEUM FACILITY INCIDENTS POST
VARANUS ISLAND, MONTARA, AND MACONDO:
HAVE WE REALLY ADDRESSED THE ROOT CAUSE?
TINA HUNTER*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the role of offshore petroleum legislation in
contributing to offshore facility integrity incidents in Australia’s offshore
petroleum jurisdiction. It examines the regulatory framework that existed
at the time of the Varanus Island, Montara, and Macondo facility incidents,
determining that the regulatory regime contributed to each of these inci-
dents. Assessing the response of the Commonwealth government to the
regulatory framework existing at the time of the events, particularly the
integration of well regulation as part of the National Offshore Petroleum
Safety Authority’s (“NOPSA”) functions and the establishment of a national
offshore regulator, this Article determines that while the integration of
well management into NOPSA’s functions has been a valuable and a sig-
nificant improvement. There is still a likelihood that differing standards
applied to the regulation of petroleum facilities (“Safety Case Regime”)
and wells (“Good Oilfield Practice”), multiple regulators, and regulatory
disjuncture may continue to contribute to facility incidents. This Article
concludes that the establishment of the National Offshore Petroleum
Titles Authority, the retainment of the Joint Authority, and the enhance-
ment of NOPSA’s functions to include environmental management have
created a regulatory framework that is complex, increasingly convoluted,
and has not addressed the root cause of facility incidents in Australia’s
offshore petroleum jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of offshore petroleum resource development in
Australia is complicated by the legal framework governing Australia’s
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offshore zone, the Australian Federation, and the struggle for state con-
trol over some marine waters during the 1970s. Established in 1967, the
offshore petroleum legislative framework was enacted in response to
the legal relationship between the Australian States/Northern Territory
(“States/NT”) and the Australian Commonwealth. The implementation
of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act 1973, a subsequent judicial chal-
lenge to the validity of the legislation, and the resultant governmental
negotiations (the Offshore Constitutional Framework) have resulted in
a multifaceted offshore petroleum regulatory framework. This resultant
regulatory framework shares the regulation of offshore petroleum activi-
ties between the States/NT, which regulates from Baseline seaward to
three nautical miles, and the Commonwealth, which regulates seaward
from three nautical miles to the extent of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze whether the regulatory re-
gime in place at the time of the Varanus Island explosion and the Montara
well blowouts contributed to the incidents. This analysis determines if
the offshore petroleum regulatory framework that existed at the time of
these events created or increased the possibility of a major safety event
by contributing to a loss of well control, and evaluates whether the reg-
ulatory responses to these incidents have lessened the risk of loss of well
control occurring again. After analyzing the regulatory framework at the
time of these offshore facility events, this Article outlines and examines
the regulatory response by the Australian government. Finally, this Article
determines whether the government regulatory reforms reduce the likeli-
hood of facility incidents resulting from loss of well control.
I. VARANUS ISLAND EXPLOSION AND THE MONTARA BLOWOUT
IN THE AUSTRALIAN OFFSHORE JURISDICTION
In 2008 and 2009, two potentially lethal facility incidents, known as
catastrophic facility integrity failures (“CFIFs”), occurred in Australia’s
offshore petroleum jurisdictions. Coupled with the subsequent Macondo
Blowout, these incidents led the petroleum industry and governments to
reassess the likelihood of facility incidents and responses to such events.
The Varanus Island gas pipeline explosion occurred at the off-
shore gas facility on Varanus Island off the northwestern Western Aus-
tralian coastline near Karratha.1 It resulted from the rupture of a gas
1 Z. LAMBERT & B. RICHARDSON, NAT’L OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTH., FINAL REPORT
OF THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE PIPE RUPTURE AND FIRE INCIDENT ON
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pipeline, cutting the supply of gas to Western Australia by thirty percent.2
Investigations into the ruptured pipeline indicate that the existing regu-
latory framework contributed to the CFIF.3 In addition, the investigation
concluded that the pipe rupture and explosion could have been avoided
if facility integrity had been managed by a single agency rather than
jointly by NOPSA and the Western Australian Department of Mines and
Petroleum (“WADMP”), since a single regulator would have been respon-
sible for the facility and the pipelines carrying the gas from the produc-
tion platform to markets onshore.4
The second incident, arguably far more serious, was the Montara
Well Blowout and subsequent oil spill on August 21, 2009. The Montara
incident was the first major marine oil spill from an Australian offshore
petroleum platform.5 It occurred in a remote area northwest of the
Western Australian coast, approximately 690km from Darwin and 250km
from Indonesia. The spill continued until November 3, 2009, a total of
seventy-four days.6 The spill was stopped when a relief well capped the
leaking well.7 Overall, approximately 4750 metric tons of oil leaked from
the well.8
The operator of the Montara Platform PTTEP Australasia
(“PTTEPAA”), outlined the probable cause of the Montara Oil Spill in its
submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry (“MCI”). According to
the submission, an initial uncontrolled hydrocarbon release (“UHR”)9 (con-
taining approximately forty to sixty barrels) occurred on the Montara Well
3 JUNE 2008 AT THE FACILITIES OPERATED BY APACHE ENERGY LIMITED ON VARANUS
ISLAND 8 (2010) (Austl.).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 8–10.
4 See id.; PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, REVIEW OF REGULATORY BURDEN ON THE UPSTREAM (OIL
AND GAS) SECTOR: RESEARCH REPORT 237 (2009) (Austl.).
5 All other major oil spills in Australia have been the result of ship-sourced pollution. For
details of all major oil spills in Australia’s waters in the last thirty years, see generally Major
Historical Incidents, AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH., http://www.amsa.gov.au/environment
/major-historical-incidents/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Major Historical Incidents].
6 Id.
7 Major Oil Spills in Australia: Montara Well Head Platform, AUSTL. MAR. SAFETY AUTH.,
https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/major-historical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead
/index.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
8 Major Historical Incidents, supra note 5.
9 The initial leak was called an Uncontrolled Hydrocarbon Release, since it contained
both oil and gas. See PTTEPAA AUSTRALASIA, TERM OF REFERENCE NO. 1, SUBMISSION TO
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, MONTARA WELL HEAD PLATFORM UNCONTROLLED RELEASE ¶ 89
(2010). In this study, “UHR” and “oil spill” have the same meaning.
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Head Platform on the H1 Well at 5:30 AM on August 21, 2009.10 This re-
lease subsided, although bubbles were seen and heard from the top of the
well conductor.11 This was followed by another UHR at 7:23 AM, of higher
pressure and volume than the initial UHR, containing a mix of unignited
oil and gas.12 Soon after, all personnel abandoned the rig, since safety
was compromised due to the presence of unignited hydrocarbons.13 Im-
mediately after the second UHR, PTTEPAA reported the UHR to the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (“AMSA”) and control of UHRs was
transferred to AMSA in accordance with the provisions of the National
Oil Plan (“NATPLAN”) and the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency
Plan (“NMOSCP”).14
The submission provided by PTTEPAA to the MCI identified the
causes of the UHR as a failure to install a 320mm Pressure Containment
Cap (“PCC”) on the H1 Well and the failure of the float in the casing
shoe.15 A 244mm PCC had been installed on the H1 Well; however, a
change order had requested a 320mm PCC to be installed.16 The absence
of the 320mm PCC was discovered by PTTEPAA when work on the well
commenced in August 2009.17 PTTEPAA was advised in March 2009 by
the drilling supervisor on the West Atlas drill rig that the PCC had been
installed. However, this was subsequently discovered by PTTEPAA not
to be the case when work on the well commenced in August 2009.18
The findings of the MCI concurred with the PTTEPAA submission,
concluding that the failure of PTTEPAA to use PCCs as a secondary well
control barrier in conjunction with the failure of the cement barrier effec-
tively left the well suspended without a satisfactorily tested and verified
10 Id. ¶ 81.
11 Id.
12 Id. ¶ 84.
13 Id.
14 PTTEPAA AUSTRALASIA, TERM OF REFERENCE NO. 5, SUBMISSION TO COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY, MONTARA WELL HEAD PLATFORM UNCONTROLLED RELEASE ¶ 1 (2010); AUSTL.
MAR. SAFETY AUTH., NATIONAL PLAN: AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL PLAN TO COMBAT POLLUTION
OF THE SEA BY OIL AND OTHER NOXIOUS AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 5 (2007); AUSTL.
MAR. SAFETY AUTH., NATIONAL MARINE OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLAN s 3.4 (2005).
15 PTTEPAA AUSTRALASIA, supra note 9, ¶ 92. This is corroborated by ATLAS DRILLING
PTY LTD, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, MONTARA WELL HEAD PLATFORM UNCONTROLLED
HYDROCARBON RELEASE: OUTLINE OF WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY ATLAS DRILLING PTE LTD.
¶ 13 (2010).
16 PTTEPAA AUSTRALASIA, supra note 9, ¶ 98.
17 Id. ¶ 100.
18 Id.
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barrier and other well control barriers.19 The MCI noted that this prac-
tice did not constitute “Good Oilfield Practice” (“GOP”) and breached
PTTEPAA’s Well Construction Standards.20
The MCI concluded that whilst the absence of tested barriers was
the proximate cause of the Montara Blowout, there were more serious
systemic factors contributing to the Montara Blowout.21 These included:
1. The Well Operations Management Plan (“WOMP”)
for the well and the well construction standards were
poor;
2. PTTEPPAA personnel had limited experience of
batch drilling;
3. Rig personnel demonstrated a manifestly inadequate
understanding of Well Construction Standards;
4. PTTEPPAA senior rig personnel were deficient in
their decision-making and judgment;
5. Manifest failures within PTTEPAA were in part at-
tributable to the relationship between PTTEPAA
and the Northern Territory Department of Resources
(“NTDOR”);
6. The NTDOR as a regulator was deficient in failing
to enforce GOP by approving the WOMP for the well;
7. The NTDOR regulatory regime was totally inade-
quate, being little more than a “tick and flick” exer-
cise, and did not reflect contemporary regulatory
practice, and;
8. Well integrity issues in general were not well scru-
tinized by Australian regulators compared to over-
seas jurisdictions.22
The third internationally known incident is the Macondo Well
Blowout and subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010
at the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. Following a loss of well integrity,
there was an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, causing
19 DAVID BORTHWICK, REPORT OF THE MONTARA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 343–45 (2010),
available at http://www.industry.gov.au/resource/Documents/upstream-petroleum/approvals
/Montara-Report.pdf.
20 Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 9–11.
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the death of eleven rig workers and rupturing the riser, leading to the
worst oil spill in history.23 The Report to the President by the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Dril-
ling concluded that the immediate cause of the Macondo Blowout and oil
spill was a loss of well integrity attributable to a series of identifiable
mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean.24
Through consideration and focus on the incidents that have oc-
curred in Australia’s offshore jurisdiction, this Article explores the notion
that the Australian offshore petroleum regulatory framework contributed
to the petroleum facility incidents and considers whether, despite sub-
stantial reforms, the regulatory framework may still contribute to future
facility incidents.
II. THE AUSTRALIAN OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The petroleum regulatory framework in Australia comprises mul-
tiple offshore jurisdictions, where both State/NT and federal governments,
as a result of Australia’s political and maritime history, undertake the
regulation of offshore petroleum activities. Federal-state relations under
Australian Federalism have been strained, particularly since the mid-
1970s, as a result of the Commonwealth declaring sovereignty over the
offshore jurisdiction when it enacted the Sea and Submerged Lands Act
1973 (“SSLA”). The multiple jurisdictions, combined with friction between
the regulators who are required to interact, have created regulatory bur-
dens and regulatory gaps in offshore petroleum activities.
The Australian petroleum regulatory framework reflects the fed-
eralist nature of Australia and the constitutional arrangement set out in
the Australian Constitution. From the first negotiations after oil finds in
Bass Strait there has been tension between the States/NT and the Com-
monwealth regarding the regulation of offshore petroleum (oil and gas).
Initial arrangements between the Commonwealth and States/NT for the
exploration and production of offshore petroleum were created under the
1967 Petroleum Agreement (“Petroleum Agreement”).25 The Petroleum
23 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING vi (2011).
24 Id. at 115.
25 CONSTANCE D. HUNT, THE OFFSHORE PETROLEUM REGIMES OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
63 (1989). This agreement was forged between the Commonwealth, States, and affected
territories and is officially known as the Agreement Relating to the Exploration for and
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Agreement did not intend to create legal relationships enforceable in a
court of law.26 Rather, it encouraged petroleum activities through uniform
legislative measures in Commonwealth Waters,27 with all governments
agreeing to cooperate to ensure regulation of offshore petroleum activities.28
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (“PSLA”) gave legal
effect to the Petroleum Agreement,29 securing offshore petroleum devel-
opment without having to resolve the jurisdictional issues between the
Commonwealth and the States/NT.30 The PSLA enacted a comprehensive
legislative “code,” creating joint Commonwealth-State/NT administra-
tion of petroleum titles.31 To reduce the capacity for the States/NT to go
their own way, the provisions of the petroleum legislation were necessar-
ily detailed,32 granting each State/NT the legislative capacity to grant
dual titles to oil companies under State/NT authority and delegated au-
thority from the Commonwealth.33 This joint management required the
establishment of two authorities to regulate petroleum activities (“the
JA/DA arrangement”):
• The Joint Authority (“JA”), which comprises the
relevant Commonwealth Minister and the respon-
sible State Minister, and;
• Designated Authority (“DA”), comprising the re-
sponsible State or Territory Minister.34
the Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, and Certain Other Resources, of the Con-
tinental Shelf of Australia and of Certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of Certain
Other Submerged Land signed October 16, 1967. Id.
26 Id. at 64.
27 For the definition of “Commonwealth Waters,” see Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse
Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 5.
28 HUNT, supra note 25, at 63.
29 Id. at 64.
30 Terrence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas, 2005
AUSTL. MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASS’N Y.B. 13.
31 Terence Daintith, A Critical Evaluation of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act as a
Regulatory Regime, 2000 AUSTL. MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASS’N Y.B. 91, 93.
32 Id. at 93–94.
33 Id. For a discussion and consideration of the regulatory framework in the pre-Montara
era, see also Tina Hunter, Australian Offshore Petroleum Regulation After the Varanus
Island Explosion and the Montara Blowout—Drowning in a Sea of Federalism?, 25 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. MAR. L. 69–89 (2011).
34 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 56 and 66 (Austl.)
[hereinafter OPAGGSA]. Under ss 56(8) and (9) of OPAGGSA, the Commonwealth Min-
ister alone is the JA for Commonwealth Waters, the external territories, and the offshore
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Following the enactment of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act
1973 and the consequential constitutional challenge by the state of New
South Wales in the Sea and Submerged Lands Case,35 sovereign rights
over Australia’s marine areas were vested in the Commonwealth. These
events heightened friction between the Commonwealth and States/NT
regarding regulatory control of Australia’s maritime zones. A negotiated
settlement between the Commonwealth and States/NT, the Offshore
Constitutional Settlement (“OCS”), was agreed to in 1980, ushering in an
era of “cooperative governance in a sea of federalism.”36
The resulting legal framework from the OCS divided the regula-
tion of offshore petroleum activities between the States/NT and Common-
wealth Governments.37 It was enacted at the State and Commonwealth
level through mirror legislation (Commonwealth and State Petroleum
(Submerged Lands Acts)),38 where each State/NT government legislated
with respect to offshore petroleum operations in identical terms to the
Commonwealth petroleum legislation.39 In addition, a plethora of other
necessary legislation was enacted to enable the implementation of the
OCS, thus conferring on the States/NT a virtually unfettered ability to
enact laws up to three nautical miles from Baseline seaward.40 Under the
areas of each of those territories. Similarly, under ss 70(8) and (9) of OPAGGSA, the
responsible Commonwealth Minister is also the DA for each of the territories and the
offshore areas of those territories. Under s 68(1), the Commonwealth as DA of the ex-
ternal areas is able to delegate the regulation to an external territory to the NT. At the
time of the Montara Blowout, the NT had been delegated as DA for the Ashmore and
Cartier Reef offshore areas.
35 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 (Austl.).
36 Nathan Evans, Offshore Petroleum in Australia—Cooperative Governance in a Sea of
Federalism, 26 DALHOUSIE L.J. 175 (2003).
37 ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 6–8 (1980)
(Austl.), http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/Internationallaw/Pages/TheOffshore
ConstitutionalSettlement.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
38 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Registration
Fees Act 1990 (WA); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Vic); Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Act 1982 (Qld); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (SA); Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Act 1982 (Tas); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (NSW); Petroleum (Sub-
merged Lands) Taxation Act 1967 (NSW), as outlined in Michael Crommelin, The Legal
Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia, in THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF
PETROLEUM LICENCES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 60, 62 (Terrence Daintith ed., 1981).
39 Crommelin, supra note 38, at 62; Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177 (Austl.).
40 This legislation is outlined in Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006
(Cth) s 5(3), at 6–7. Required acts included Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980;
Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Powers) Act 1980; Coastal Waters (State Title) Act
1980; Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Title) Act; and Offshore Minerals Act 1984
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agreed terms of the OCS, offshore petroleum activities are regulated
through the JA/DA arrangement as follows:
• The States/NT regulate the waters wholly within
the State/NT, such as bays and estuaries in accor-
dance with Sections 8 and 10 of the Sea and Sub-
merged Lands Act 1972 (State Waters);
• The States/NT regulate waters from the Baseline
seaward to 3nm (Coastal Waters); and
• The Commonwealth regulates waters seaward of
3nm to the limits of the EEZ, 200nm from Baseline
(Commonwealth Waters).
The OCS agreement remains in force, with the States/NT and
Commonwealth jurisdictions outlined in Section 5 of OPAGGSA41 and
illustrated in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1. Australian Offshore Petroleum Regulatory
Framework, 201442
(Cth); see also R. CULLEN, FEDERALISM IN ACTION: THE AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN OFF-
SHORE DISPUTES 108–10 (1990).
41 OPAGGSA, supra note 34, s 5.
42 TINA HUNTER & JOHN CHANDLER, PETROLEUM LAW IN AUSTRALIA 132 (2013).
594 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:585
Prior to 2005, this negotiated regulatory structure meant that
duplication occurred in the regulation and administration of worker and
facility safety (collectively known as “OHS”) in the Australian offshore
petroleum sector.
Initially, health and safety arrangements in offshore petroleum
activities were shared between the Commonwealth and States/NT under
the PSLA.43 According to the PSLA, the regulation of health and safety
on offshore petroleum facilities was a matter for the States/NT, which
carried out the day-to-day regulation of offshore petroleum health and
safety activities under a mix of Commonwealth Law (in Commonwealth
Waters) and State Law (in Coastal and State Waters).44 Until the 1990s,
this safety regulatory approach was prescriptive, where the relevant
States/NT and Commonwealth statutes specified the exact conditions for
compliance with safety requirements on offshore facilities and the means
by which they should be accomplished. This legislation prescribed spe-
cific laws that had to be complied with, and the regulator determined
what was safe for the industry.45
Like many other petroleum-producing countries, the statutes gov-
erning offshore petroleum health and safety underwent significant re-
fashioning in the 1970s. The amendments took place as a consequence
of the Robens and Cullen Reports in the UK arising from the Sea Gem
and Piper Alpha facility incidents respectively.46 This resulted in a sig-
nificant shift from the old-style prescriptive regulation to sanctions and
enhanced inspection powers.47 In 1991, the key outcomes of the Cullen
Report were implemented in Australia.48 This ushered in an era of reforms
to the regulation of Australian offshore petroleum. However, these major
reforms of Australia’s approach to offshore petroleum health and safety
were somewhat difficult to implement, since the reforms in Australia oc-
curred within the context of the OCS between the Commonwealth and
43 HUNT, supra note 25, at 63.
44 Id.
45 Patrick Brazil & Peter Wilkinson, The Establishment of a National Offshore Petroleum
Safety Authority, 24 AUSTL. RES. & ENERGY L.J. 87, 88 (2005).
46 LORD ROBENS, SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 1970–1972
(1972); Preben H. Lindoe et al., Robust Offshore Risk Regulation—An Assessment of US,
UK, and Norwegian Approaches (Paper presented at ESREL, June 25–29, 2012).
47 Richard Johnstone, Michael Quinland & Maria McNamara, Enforcing Upstream: Aus-
tralian Health and Safety Inspectors and Upstream Duty Holders 23 (National Research
Centre for OHS Regulation, Australian National University, Working Paper No. 77, 2010).
48 Offshore Petroleum Safety, AUSTL. DEP’T RES., INDUS. & TOURISM, http://www.innovation
.gov.au/resource/UpstreamPetroleum/OffshorePetroleumSafety/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Apr. 9, 2014).
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States/NT rather than a unitary system such as the UK.49 This meant
that the Safety Case Regime (“SCR”) was implemented in a federal sys-
tem, requiring a coordinated and harmonized approach under the shared
Commonwealth-States/NT system regulating offshore petroleum activi-
ties.50 When the safety reforms were initially implemented, there were
multiple agencies in multiple jurisdictions regulating safety in offshore
petroleum activities.51
Recognizing these regulatory challenges, the Commonwealth Min-
ister for Resources commissioned a review of the progress of safety case
implementation in the Australian offshore petroleum sector in the late
1990s.52 Conducted by the former Chief Executive of the UK Health and
Safety Executive Dr. Tony Barrell, the resulting report recommended
safety regulation reform to achieve greater regulatory consistency within
and between State/NT and Commonwealth government regulatory re-
gimes.53 The Commonwealth accepted the recommendations of the Barrell
Report, commissioning a review of offshore petroleum safety arrangements
in 1999. An independent review team of international offshore safety ex-
perts was assembled, and reported to the Commonwealth in March 2000.54
The Independent Review Team (“IRT”) concluded that:
the Australian legal and administrative framework, and
the day-to-day application of this framework, for regula-
tion of health, safety and environment in the offshore pe-
troleum industry is complicated and insufficient to ensure
appropriate, effective and cost efficient regulation of the off-
shore petroleum industry.55
The IRT was the first overall assessment of the Australian off-
shore petroleum regime and it clearly identified the inherent deficiencies
of the existing regime. It stated that “much would require improvement
for the regime to deliver world-class safety practice.”56 Furthermore, the
49 TONY BARRELL, DEP’T PRIMARY INDUS. & ENERGY, SECOND REVIEW OF THE MANAGEMENT
OF SAFETY IN THE OFFSHORE OPERATIONS OF BHP PETROLEUM (1997) (Austl.).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 ODD BJERRE FINNESTAD ET AL., DEP’T INDUS., SCIENCE &RES., OFFSHORE SAFETY & SEC.,
PETROLEUM & ELEC. DIV., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM (2000) (Austl.).
55 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
56 Id.
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IRT found that the greatest impediment to the delivery of world-class
safety practice was the number of acts, regulations, and directions reg-
ulating offshore petroleum activities. In addition, the numerous jurisdic-
tions as a result of the OCS and differing sets of legal documents for each
jurisdiction created legislative overlaps and inconsistencies.57 Finally, the
IRT identified that State/NT safety regulators lacked regulatory skills,
capacity, and consistency and did not have a clear view of their role.58
Similarly, the IRT concluded that the Commonwealth did not have the
sufficient resources, technical expertise, credibility, or authority to drive
the changes required to attain world-class safety practice.59 In short, the
IRT identified a regulatory system that posed a significant risk to off-
shore petroleum health, safety, and the environment.60
The IRT made three recommendations to improve the safety
regime. It recommended that the current Commonwealth safety frame-
work of legal documents be revised.61 Furthermore, it recommended that
the current safety regulatory framework be revised.62 Most importantly,
it recommended the development of a single petroleum safety regulator
to oversee safety in Commonwealth Waters.63
The Commonwealth agreed with the recommendations of the IRT,
realizing that a single regulator would bring efficiencies through econo-
mies of scale, uniform procedures, and greater consistency in the inter-
pretation and application of regulations and guidelines.64 This would also
reduce regulatory burden on industry.65 Seeking to establish the national
regulator, the Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources
(“MCMPR”) endorsed the creation of a single safety regulator, noting that
such a joint offshore authority would bring significant benefits, ensure
better safety outcomes for individuals working on offshore platforms, and
reduce risks to the environment.66
57 Id. at 4, 41.
58 Id. at 4–5, 18–19.
59 Id. at 4–5.
60 FINNESTAD ET AL., supra note 54, at 39.
61 Id. at 40.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ON MINERALS AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES, MCMPR COMMUNIQUÉ:
SUMMARY OF MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING 13 SEPTEMBER 2002, PERTH (2002), available
at http://www.nopsema.gov.au/assets/document/Final_Communique_Sept02.pdf.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1.
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Whilst the Commonwealth favored the establishment of a joint
national regulator, the States/NT strongly argued for the retention of the
existing disaggregated arrangements.67 However, workforce representa-
tives and the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Associa-
tion (“APPEA”), the peak industry body, both indicated that the case for
the continuation of existing arrangements was neither “compelling nor
convincing.”68 Furthermore, workplace representatives were convinced that
only the development of a single national safety authority would “achieve
effective uniform processes across jurisdictions.”69 The Commonwealth
agreed that the creation of a single national regulator in Commonwealth
Waters would be most beneficial, although it also recognized that such ar-
rangements may “result in a number of undesirable effects for the States/
NT and for industry operating in both Commonwealth’ and State/NT ju-
risdictions.”70 Accepting these undesirable effects, the Commonwealth
proposed the creation of an independent regulator regulating Common-
wealth, State, and Coastal Waters71 with the option of States/ NT confer-
ring their powers over Coastal and State Waters on the Commonwealth.72
The Commonwealth’s decision to establish NOPSA led to the
introduction and passing of two Commonwealth Acts: the Petroleum
(Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 2003, to make substantial legislative
amendments to the PSLA to establish NOPSA,73 and the Offshore Petro-
leum (Safety Levies) Bill 2003, to provide for full cost recovery to indus-
try.74 As part of the legislative reforms to the PSLA, the role of NOPSA
was set out, including its structure and governance.75 Secondly, amend-
ments were made to the occupational health and safety provisions of the
PSLA, inserted in 1993 when the SCR was implemented. Furthermore,
vast legislative reform to all State/NT mirror legislation was required in
order to implement the new national regulator in State and Coastal
Waters where those States conferred upon the Commonwealth the right
to regulate offshore petroleum safety in those waters.
67 DEP’T INDUS., SCI., & RES., OFFSHORE SAFETY & SEC., PETROLEUM & ELEC. DIV., FUTURE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGULATION OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY 64 (2001) (Austl.)
[hereinafter FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS].
68 Id. at 7.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 8.
71 Id. at 20.
72 Id. at 60.
73 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) pt IIIC, div 1, 150XA (Austl.).
74 Offshore Petroleum (Safety Levies) Bill 2003 (Cth) s 11 (Austl.).
75 Petroleum Amendment Act 2003 pt IIIC, div 2.
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The necessary legislative reforms were completed and NOPSA
was established on January 1, 2005.76 Most, but not all, States/NT juris-
dictions conferred the regulation of safety in State and Coastal Waters
upon NOPSA.77 Furthermore, NOPSA was only charged with safety of
offshore petroleum facilities, whilst well control and environmental reg-
ulation remained with the States under the JA/DA arrangement.78
At the time of the Varanus Island Explosion and the Montara
Blowout, multiple agencies regulated offshore petroleum facilities and
safety:
• Day-to-day petroleum operations, pipelines, and
subsea facilities in Commonwealth Waters are reg-
ulated by a JA, comprising the relevant Common-
wealth and State Ministers. The JA delegates the
regulation to a DA, comprising the State Minister
and that Minister’s agency;
• Day-to-day petroleum operations, pipelines, and
subsea facilities in Coastal and State Waters are
regulated by the relevant state agency;
• Environmental aspects of offshore petroleum ac-
tivities in all waters are regulated by the relevant
State or the Commonwealth department, depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, and;
• Safety of all offshore facilities in all Waters except
Western Australia State and Coastal Waters are
regulated by NOPSA.79
An additional regulatory layer consists of the acts and regulations ad-
dressing the regulation of the environment, natural and cultural heritage,
and native title rights.
The multiple agencies and jurisdictions in this regulatory frame-
work relied on the States/NT performing their various responsibilities
and discharging their obligations in a competent manner. However, with
so many regulators and multiple jurisdictions, a number of inconsisten-
cies occurred, particularly in terms of regulatory approaches, procedures,
and resources available to each of the regulators when discharging their
76 Id. at Commencement.
77 Id.
78 FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 67, at 28.
79 Id.
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obligations with respect to the regulation of offshore petroleum activities.80
These were highlighted by the MCI.
The establishment of NOPSA was designed to provide numerous
benefits to the regulation of health and safety on offshore petroleum
facilities.81 Most importantly, it sought to create a single body that reg-
ulated safety for offshore petroleum activities, rather than the plethora
of regulation that existed prior to the establishment of NOPSA. However,
the establishment of NOPSA created vertical and horizontal regulatory
disjuncture—areas where there was either regulatory overlap or regula-
tory gaps.
Prior to Varanus and Montara, the vertical regulation of petroleum
activities was split between regulatory agencies, with NOPSA responsi-
ble for the regulation of safety on facilities, whilst the regulation of the
well and well operations (subsea regulation) was the responsibility of the
DA. In addition, where the States had not conferred regulatory powers
for their State and Coastal Waters to NOPSA, safety in these waters was
regulated by the States/NT from the Baseline seaward to three nautical
miles, where NOPSA’s jurisdiction then commenced.82 Because Western
Australia had not conferred powers to NOPSA for Coastal and State Waters
and Islands, the regulation of occupational health and safety was not
uniform.83 Adding to this regulatory disjuncture was environmental reg-
ulation under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act 1999 (“EPBCA”), the overarching environmental regulatory framework
for State, Coastal, and Commonwealth Waters, which operates in con-
junction with State/NT environmental legislation.84
Whilst the regulation of the safety of offshore petroleum facilities
in Australia appeared increasingly harmonized with the establishment
of NOPSA in 2005, several reports, as well as the Varanus and Montara
incidents, tell another story. Since 2008, there have been several detailed
analyses of the regulation of offshore petroleum facilities with all reports
finding that the existing regulatory arrangements fail to demonstrate
80 DEP’T RES., ENERGY & TOURISM, SUBMISSION TO THE MONTARA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
2.34 (2010) (Austl.), available at http://www.montarainquiry.gov.au/downloads/SUBM
.3005.0001.0001.pdf.
81 Petroleum Amendment Act 2003, supra note 73, at pt IIIC, div 1, 150XA.
82 FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 67, at 20.
83 PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, REVIEW OF REGULATORY BURDEN ON THE UPSTREAM (OIL AND
GAS) SECTOR: RESEARCH REPORT XXXII (2009) (Austl.).
84 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ch 2, pt 3, div 1,
sub-div F (Austl.).
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best practice standards. The 2008 review of NOPSA’s operations (“2008
NOPSA Report”) concluded that NOPSA had made good progress in
building a world-class OHS regime.85 However, it also articulated that to
reduce the risk of a CFIF, NOPSA’s legislative responsibility needs to be
extended to cover the complete hydrocarbon chain (from well to a trans-
port transfer point or a system boundary), and that retaining multiple
regulators was not best practice.86
The Australian Productivity Commission also considered regula-
tion of safety in the offshore jurisdiction in its 2009 Review of Regulatory
Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector (“PC Report”).87
It criticized the regulatory arrangements of the offshore petroleum sector,
describing the regime as “complex.”88 This complexity was illustrated by
highlighting that twenty-two petroleum and pipeline laws applied at both
the Commonwealth and State/NT levels with more than 150 statutes
governing upstream petroleum activities in such areas as occupational
health and safety, native title, and environmental protection.89 Most im-
portantly, the report identified that well over fifty State, Commonwealth,
and Territory government agencies regulate upstream petroleum activi-
ties, incorporating the regulation of health and safety, facility integrity,
resource management, well operations, and environmental issues.90
The PC Report concurred with the 2008 NOPSA Report, conclud-
ing that the legislative coverage of NOPSA should be extended to include
the integrity of all offshore facilities, including pipelines, subsea equip-
ment, and wells, as regulatory duplication and complexity arising from the
framework of multiple regulators creates unnecessary economic costs.91
This is because industry is required to comply with three sets of regula-
tory frameworks—one for occupational health and safety, one for well,
facility and pipelines integrity, and a third for environmental assess-
ment, compliance, and monitoring, creating regulatory overlap, complexity,
and inconsistency.92
85 MAGNE OGNEDAL ET AL., REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY
AUTHORITY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM 157
(2008) (Austl.).
86 Id. at 6, 10.
87 PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 83.
88 Id. at XXXIII.
89 Id. at 50.
90 Id. at 56.
91 Id. at 167.
92 See id.
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III. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: REGULATION OF WELL INTEGRITY
A major area of regulatory inconsistency has been well regulation.
In its submission to the Productivity Commission in 2009, APPEA con-
cluded that the area requiring major reform is the administration of
WOMPs, subsea equipment and pipelines.93 This reform was required
because regulatory responsibilities for these activities were divided
between the DAs and NOPSA and these activities carry the most risks
to the integrity of a facility.94 APPEA also noted that regulatory interac-
tion and uniformity is critical to the safety performance of operations and
should be regulated by a single body.95
The PC report concluded that the sum effect of the large number
of statutes regulating offshore petroleum, split over a large number of
regulatory bodies, is a regulatory burden for stakeholders and regulatory
inconsistencies.96 Such inconsistencies, gaps, and complexities may result
in either regulatory duplication or, worse still, in incidents at offshore
facilities.97 The Varanus Island and Montara incidents served to demon-
strate the effects of the Australian regulatory structure.
The investigation into the Varanus Island explosion concluded
that “the pipe rupture and explosion could have been avoided if facility
integrity had been managed by a single agency,” instead of together by
NOPSA and WADMP, “since a single regulator would have been respon-
sible for the facility and the pipelines carrying the gas from the production
platform to markets onshore.”98 Essentially, the horizontally disjunctive
regulatory system in force at the time of the Varanus explosion, which
split regulation of the pipeline between State and Commonwealth juris-
diction was a major contributor to the explosion.99 Furthermore, an as-
sessment on the effectiveness of Australian offshore petroleum safety
regulation by Kym Bills and David Agostini conducted in 2009100 after
93 AUSTL. PETROLEUM PROD. & EXPLORATION ASS’N, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REVIEW
OF REGULATORY BURDEN ON THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM (OIL AND GAS) SECTOR 20 (2008)
[hereinafter APPEA], available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/83422
/sub016.pdf.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 7, 35.
97 Id. at 35.
98 Hunter, supra note 33, at 77.
99 Id.
100 KIM BILLS & DAVID AGOSTINI, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY REGULATION: MARINE
ISSUES iii (2009), available at http://www.innovation.gov.au/resource/Documents/upstream
-petroleum/safety/Marine%20Issues_web.pdf.
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the Varanus Island CFIF, noted that the failure to vertically integrate
regulation of a facility to include well integrity was detrimental to off-
shore petroleum safety. Consequently, the assessment stated that the
SCR regulating pipelines does not presently represent best practice.101
The assessment also noted that in complex, high hazard industries such
as offshore oil and gas, society expects a robust regulatory system where
operators maintain safety to minimize risk of a CFIF, and regulators are
required to assure the public that this is being done.102
The Montara Blowout in particular demonstrated the difficulties
associated with the splitting of the vertical regulation of wells and facil-
ities between the DA and NOPSA. The MCI noted that the immediate
causes of the Montara incident were poor cementing of the cement shoe
and a failure of the float valves.103 Essentially, the integrity of the well
was compromised, leading to loss of well control and, eventually, a blow-
out. The MCI identified that the root cause was a systemic failure of the
management systems and non-compliance with the operating procedures
that had been set out in the facility safety case.104 The MCI blamed the
failure of the operator to adhere to the system’s design and the failure of
the regulator to ensure compliance to the safety case.105 In this case, the
NTDOR, as regulator, was found by the MCI to have failed in its role of en-
suring compliance with the SCR and maintaining good oilfield practice.106
The MCI rightly identified that the immediate cause of the Montara
Blowout was the failure of the cement shoe and the failure of the float
valves, leading to loss of well control.107 However, this Article contends
that the MCI erred in identifying systemic failure of the management
systems and non-compliance with the operating procedures set out in the
facility SCR as a root cause of the Montara Blowout. NOPSA notes that
the SCR is an objective or goal-setting regime for the management of petro-
leum facilities.108 This is based on the principle that legislation sets the
broad safety goals to be attained and the operator of the facility develops
101 Id. at 17.
102 PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 83, at 273.
103 BORTHWICK, supra note 19, at 7.
104 Id. at 6.
105 Id. at 6, 152.
106 Id. at 14, 16–17.
107 Id. at 7.
108 See Safety Cross Approach, NAT’L OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY & EVNT’L MGMT.
AUTH., http://www.nopsema.gov.au/safety/safety-case/safety-case-approach/ (last visited
Apr. 9, 2014).
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the most appropriate method of achieving those goals.109 This system thus
requires a safety case document to be prepared by the facility operator,
proving the safety of the facility.110 It applies the principle, as outlined
by Lord Cullen in the Piper Alpha Report, that those who create the risk
must manage it.111 The safety case document is required to identify haz-
ards and risks, describe how the risks are to be controlled, and describe
the safety management system in place to ensure those controls are
effectively and consistently applied.112 Therefore, it is a facility operator’s
role to assess facility processes, procedures, and systems to identify and
evaluate risks and to implement appropriate controls to remove or reduce
those risks.113
At the time of these incidents, the SCR was not applied to the
management of wells; rather it was confined only to the facilities that
drill the wells. Therefore, whilst the SCR is applied to offshore installa-
tions and facilities, it is not, and has not, been applied to the control of
wells and WOMPs in Australia and many other jurisdictions, including the
USA and the UK. Rather, wells are regulated to the standard of GOP,114
a term defined in the OPAGGSA as “all those things that are generally
accepted as good and safe in: (a) the carrying on of exploration for petro-
leum or (b) petroleum recovery operations.”115 Legislative provisions per-
taining to WOMPs and well management prior to Varanus and Montara
were outlined in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of Well
Operations) Regulations 2004.116 Consequently, there was a vertical reg-
ulatory disjuncture between the regulation of offshore petroleum facili-
ties integrity under the SCR and the regulation of WOMPs and well
integrity under GOP.
The inquiries into the Varanus and Montara incidents attributed
causation of both incidents to the existing regulatory framework, thus
demonstrating that the structure and function of the petroleum regulatory
framework significantly contributed to facility incidents in Australia’s
109 See BORTHWICK, supra note 19, at 19.
110 Id.
111 WILLIAM DOUGLAS CULLEN, THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE PIPER ALPHA DISASTER (1990).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Resource Management and Admin-
istration) Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 5.08(1)(b) (Austl.) [hereinafter RMA].
115 OPAGGSA, supra note 34, at s 7.
116 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management Well Operations) Regulations 2004 (Cth)
reg 3 (Austl.).
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offshore petroleum sector. In particular, the Montara Blowout and subse-
quent MCI demonstrated to the public that the robust regulatory system
that should have been inherent was in fact absent. The MCI also concurred
with the 2008 recommendations from the 2008 NOPSA Report, the 2009
recommendations of the Productivity Commission, and the recommenda-
tions of Bills and Agostini in 2009 that the legislated coverage of NOPSA
should be extended to cover the whole of the petroleum production chain,
similar to the Norwegian approach to facility integrity regulation.117
IV. RESPONSE TO THE VARANUS ISLAND AND MONTARA INCIDENTS
A. Legislative Reform
The Varanus and Montara incidents prompted the Australian
government to proceed with regulatory reform of offshore petroleum
legislation. In 2009, the Commonwealth Government embarked on a
program to consolidate the numerous existing offshore petroleum regula-
tions and guidelines. The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas (Safety)
Regulations (2009) brought together safety regulations into a single reg-
ulation and repealed the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Occupational
Health and Safety) Regulations 1993, the Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
(Management of Safety on Offshore Facilities) Regulations 1996, and the
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Diving Safety) Regulations 2002.118 Also
in 2009, significant amendments were made to the Offshore Petroleum and
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act (Environment) Regulations 1999, and the
regulations were renamed the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Act (Environment) Regulations 2009 (although the regulations had
commenced on 1 October 1999).119 In response to the Montara Blowout,
the amendments included changes regarding requirements for oil spill
contingency plans.120 Significantly, the final part of the reform to offshore
petroleum regulations was completed in April 2011. This included:
• The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage
(Greenhouse Gas Datum) Regulations 2010;
117 BORTHWICK, supra note 19, at 19–20.
118 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas (Safety) Regulations (2009) (Cth) reg 1.3 (Austl.).
119 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Environment) Regulations 2009 (Cth)
reg 2 (Austl.).
120 Id. at Reg. 14(8).
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• The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage
(Management of Greenhouse Gas Well Operations)
Regulations 2010;
• The Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage
Regulations 1985;
• The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Data Manage-
ment) Regulations 2004;
• The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Datum) Regu-
lations 2002;
• The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Management of
Well Operations) Regulations 2004; and
• The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Pipelines) Reg-
ulations 2001.121
Existing regulations were combined and amended, becoming the Offshore
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Resource Management and Ad-
ministration) Regulations 2011 (“Resource Management Regulations”).122
The Commonwealth government also introduced reforms to the
OPAGGSA and related regulations regarding the management of well
operations and WOMPs. Legislation introduced into Federal Parliament
in February 2010 as part of the reforms to the OPAGGSA under the Off-
shore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Legislation Amendment
(Miscellaneous Measures) Bill 2010 (“Offshore Petroleum Bill”) sought to
augment the powers of NOPSA by conferring functions and powers in
relation to the non-OHS structural integrity of facilities, wells, and well-
related equipment.123 Under the amendments proposed in the Offshore
Petroleum Bill, the structural integrity of wells (including WOMPs) that
previously fell outside of the auspices of NOPSA were to be regulated by
NOPSA.124 Importantly, this provided an integrated approach to petroleum
regulation. The bill was passed, conferring the regulation of well manage-
ment and well integrity on NOPSA, thus enabling NOPSA to approve or
reject WOMPs, as well as to regulate individual well activities.125
This regulatory reform integrated the vertical regulation of pe-
troleum activities (for example, the regulation of facility activities and
121 RMA, supra note 114, at reg 1.03.
122 Id.
123 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Legis-
lation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) 2 (Austl.).
124 Id. at 2–3.
125 See Well Integrity, NAT’L OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTH., http://www.nopsema
.gov.au/well-integrity/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
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well activities by a single regulator).126 This was a significant improve-
ment on the vertical regulatory disjuncture that had previously existed,
where platform and facilities were regulated by NOPSA and the DA-
managed WOMPs/Well Operations. However, it is important to note that
there is still some vertical regulatory disjuncture in the regulation of
offshore petroleum activities. This disjuncture arises due to the appli-
cation of differing standards for the regulation of facilities and wells.
Petroleum facilities are regulated by the SCR, which requires an opera-
tor to reduce the risk of harm according to the As Low as Reasonably
Practicable (“ALARP”) standard.127 Effectively, the application of the SCR
and ALARP applies a “best practice” standard, where the risk of facility
incidents is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable.128
The SCR is currently not applied to the regulation of wells. The
regulation of well operations offshore is not undertaken in accordance
with the SCR, although some elements of the SCR are incorporated in
well integrity regulation. When referring to well integrity, Regulation 5.02
of the RMA Regulations requires that a bore is “subject only to risks that
have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonable practicable.”129
Rather than requiring the reduction of well blowout and loss of
well control to ALARP, the regulatory standards in Australia for wells
that are enforced are that of GOP: all those things that are generally
accepted as good and safe in the carrying on of petroleum activities. The
regulatory standard for well operations and activity outlined in Regula-
tion 5.08 of the RMA Regulations requires that risks are identified and
managed according to sound engineering principles, standards, specifica-
tions and good oilfield practice.130 Furthermore, Regulation 5.09(1) requires
operators to demonstrate that well activities and ongoing operations works
are carried out in accordance with GOP.131 This is a standard that is not
defined;132 it is dependent upon industry practice. The difficulty in the
126 Id.
127 APPEA, supra note 93, at 21.
128 Id.
129 RMA, supra note 114, at reg 5.02.
130 Id. at reg 5.08(1)(b).
131 Id. at reg 5.09(1).
132 The foremost petroleum dictionary Sclumberger’s Oilfield Glossary does not define the
term “Good Oilfield Practice,” nor does it define “accepted practice” or “oilfield practice.”
The Commonwealth issued a guidance note regarding GOP, but it does little to provide a
clear definition of GOP. See NAT’L OFFSHORE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTH., GOOD OILFIELD
PRACTICE: A GUIDELINE IN RELATION TO THE OFFSHORE PETROLEUM AND GREENHOUSE GAS
STORAGE ACT 2006 1 (2013), available at http://www.nopta.gov.au/_documents/guidelines
/good-oilfield-practice-guideline.pdf.
2014] OFFSHORE PETROLEUM FACILITY INCIDENTS 607
term lies in its interpretation; is the term to be interpreted as the highest
standard of operation and behavior, or as the lowest common denomina-
tor for standard of operation and company behavior?133 Given that the
Commonwealth definition of GOP is “all those things that are generally
accepted as good and safe,” it may be seen that GOP in Australia is the
lowest common denominator for standard of operation rather than the
highest standard of operation where the risk of an incident is reduced to
as low as reasonably practicable.
Unless and until well activities are regulated to a maximum stan-
dard similar to the ALARP principle under the SCR (where the risk of well
blowout or loss of control is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable),
there is an increased likelihood that well blowouts will occur. Indeed, the
United States National Academy of Science, in its 2010 investigation into
drilling safety,134 concluded that, given the critical role that margins of
safety play in maintaining well control, guidelines should be established
to ensure that the design approach incorporates protection against the
various risks associated with drilling,135 recommending that good opera-
tional and best practices should be used in the construction of a well.136
B. Establishment of a Commonwealth Regulatory System
As a consequence of the PC Report, NOPSA Report, Bills and
Agostini’s Report, and findings from the Varanus and Montara Inquiries,
the Commonwealth Government announced in August 2009 that it in-
tended to create a national offshore petroleum regulator (“NOPR”), to
commence operations by January 1, 2012.137 The Commonwealth noted
that fundamental institutional reform for offshore petroleum regula-
tion was required as a result of the JA/DA arrangement, which led to
significant regulatory duplication, slow decision-making, unclear regula-
tory accountability, inefficient use of regulatory resources, inconsistent
decision-making across Commonwealth offshore areas, and resistance to
133 Alexandra S. Wawryk, International Environmental Standards in the Oil Industry:
Improving the Operations of Transnational Oil Companies in Emerging Economies, 20
J. ENERGY NAT. RES. L. 402, 430 (2002).
134 NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., MACONDO WELL–DEEPWATER HORIZON BLOWOUT: LESSONS
FOR IMPROVING OFFSHORE DRILLING SAFETY (2010), available at http://www.wellintegrity
.net/Documents/NAE-NRC%20Report%202011-12-14.pdf.
135 Id. at 43.
136 Id. at 44.
137 DEP’T RES., ENERGY & TOURISM, COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REVIEW 8–9 (2011) (Austl.) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO PRO-
DUCTIVITY COMM’N REVIEW].
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reform.138 Furthermore, the Commonwealth noted that the creation of a
national offshore petroleum regulator had the potential to significantly
reduce the time for approvals processes by reducing administrative du-
plication, streamlining regulatory processes, providing greater transpar-
ency in decision-making, and consolidating resources.139 Demonstrating
its commitment to institutional reform, the Commonwealth declared in
February 2011 that:
[I]n dealing with recent approvals under the Act and the
uncontrolled release of oil and gas from the Montara Well-
head Platform in the Timor Sea, it has become more clearly
apparent that decisions relating to safety, environmental
management and resource management have significant
overlapping implications.140
To fund the implementation of a NOPR, amendments to the
OPAGGSA passed under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2010 en-
abled the Commonwealth to retain money raised from industry registration
fees under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Registra-
tion Fees) Act 2006, rather than being returned to the States/NT.141
Peak industry body APPEA strongly expressed the view that
NOPSA and the yet to be created NOPR should be a single entity with
a number of practical and administrative benefits that would flow from
a single regulatory authority and strong synergies in the regulation of
safety and environment.142 APPEA’s position supported the findings of
the MCI, which recommended that the roles of NOPSA and the NOPR be
combined.143 This established a single regulatory authority responsible
for safety, well integrity, and environmental plans, whilst industry policy
and resource development would reside with government agencies.144
138 Id.
139 NAT’L OFFSHORE PETROLEUM TITLES ADM’R, COST RECOVERY IMPACT STATEMENT:
1 NOVEMBER 2013 – 30 JUNE 2016 12 (2013) (Austl.).
140 RESPONSE TO PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N REVIEW, supra note 137.
141 Sharon Wilson et al., OPGGSA Amendment Update—Miscellaneous Measures Bill,
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=83cfbeb2-beab
-4d53-8b17-bd609a868b6e (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
142 RESPONSE TO PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N REVIEW, supra note 137.
143 BORTHWICK, supra note 19, at 20.
144 Id.
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After much contemplation regarding the most suitable structure
for a national petroleum regulator, the MCMPR considered the Common-
wealth’s proposed regulatory reform in February 2011. The recommended
reforms tabled at the meeting sought to expand NOPSA’s powers to in-
corporate environmental management, with the enlarged regulator to be
called the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Man-
agement Authority (“NOPSEMA”), and a new National Offshore Petro-
leum Titles Authority (“NOPTA”).145 The MCMPR enforced the proposed
regulatory structure, rejecting the industry call for a single safety and
title regulator. By accepting the Commonwealth reform proposals, the
MCMPR endorsed the splitting of regulatory functions between NOPSEMA
and the new NOPTA (similar to other petroleum jurisdictions, including
the UK and Norway), as well as retaining the existing JA arrangement
to ensure the relevant State/NT ministers retained a voice in offshore
petroleum activities adjacent to their State and Coastal Waters.
Under the NOPSEMA/NOPTA reform proposed by the Common-
wealth:
• The JA would be retained for key title decisions;
• NOPTA, an authority within the Department of
Resources, Energy and Tourism advises the JA on
resource titles, registration of titles, and collection
of data; and
• The expanded NOPSEMA regulates well and pipe-
line integrity, environment plans, and day-to-day
operations of petroleum activities within Common-
wealth Waters.146
Under this model, the regulatory functions of environmental plans
and compliance under the OPAGGSA were moved from the JA/DA ar-
rangement to NOPSEMA. The Federal Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities remains the regula-
tor of environmental approvals and compliance under the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.147
The legislative reform required to implement the new regulatory
framework was implemented through the passing of the Offshore Petro-
leum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Amendment (National Regulator) Act
145 RESPONSE TO PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N REVIEW, supra note 137, at 9.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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2011 and amendment of OPAGGSA as well as other relevant acts and
regulations. The enactment of the National Regulator Act established
the expanded NOPSEMA and the new NOPTA, both commencing their
regulatory role on January 1, 2012. From January 2012, the regulatory
framework for offshore petroleum activities comprises:
• In Commonwealth Waters: NOPSEMA, for envi-
ronmental management and safety, NOPTA (which
replaced the DA) for title administration, and the
existing JA;
• In Coastal Waters: NOPSEMA (if states wish to
confer OHS, well and structural integrity, and envi-
ronmental functions. Most States, with the excep-
tion of Western Australia, conferred well and OHS
regulation on NOPSEMA), NOPTA, and the JA; and
• In State Waters: Regulation by the State regulator
(or NOPSEMA/NOPTA, if conferred to the Common-
wealth). Western Australia has retained the regu-
lation of petroleum activities in State Waters.
Following enactment of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse
Gas Storage Amendment (National Regulator) Act 2011, the establishment
of NOPTA, and the enlargement of the role of NOPSA into NOPSEMA,
the Minister for Resources, Energy and Tourism declared that: “the re-
ports of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, the Productivity Commission,
and Bills and Agostini all pointed to the need for one national body to have
responsibility for regulating offshore activities if we are to improve safety
and mitigate the risk of major incidents in the future.”148
However, it is also important to note that numerous reports, in-
cluding the 2008 NOPSA Report, the OPC Report, and the Bills and
Agostini Report, have all reiterated the need to establish horizontally
integrated regulation of petroleum activities across all jurisdictions and
across the entire upstream chain.149 In particular, the 2008 NOPSA
Report cautioned against multiple regulators, noting that:
148 Esmarie Swanepoel, Senate Gives Nod to Single Offshore Petroleum Regulator, ENGI-
NEERING NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/senate
-gives-nod-to-single-offshore-petroleum-regulator-2011-09-16 (quoting the Resources and
Energy Minister, Martin Ferguson).
149 PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 83; BILLS & AGOSTINI, supra note 100; OGNEDAL,
GRIFFITHS & LAKE, supra note 85.
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[T]o reduce the risk of a catastrophic facility integrity fail-
ure (CFIF), NOPSA’s legislative responsibility needs to be
extended to cover the complete hydrocarbon chain (from
well to a transport transfer point or a system boundary),
and retaining multiple regulators was not best practice.150
V. HAS THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO VARANUS ISLAND
AND MONTARA REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD OF FACILITY
INTEGRITY FAILURE?
The Varanus Island and Montara incidents highlighted a number
of fundamental issues relating to the regulation of offshore petroleum
facilities. The MCI was struck by the substantial divergence of offshore
regulatory practices in Australia,151 which continues to be reflected in the
regulation of well activity, as highlighted by safety and environment re-
quirements to reduce risk to ALARP and well activities and operations to
be undertaken in accordance with GOP. Furthermore, the MCI concurred
with the view of other recent inquiries into offshore petroleum152 that, at
a minimum, the proposal of the Australian Productivity Commission to
establish a National Offshore Petroleum Regulator should be pursued.153
The MCI also concurred with previous reports that well integrity should
be moved to NOPSA, since ensuring well integrity is essential for facility
safety and integrity.154
CONCLUSION
The regulation of well operations and well management by
NOPSEMA has provided a much stronger level of vertical regulatory
integration of petroleum activities, since well operations and facilities re-
sponsible for drilling wells are regulated by the same regulator. However,
while well integrity and operations and facility integrity and operations
are regulated according to different standards and practice (use of the SCR
for facility integrity and GOP for well integrity, as noted in Regulation
5.08(1)(b)), there may be a greater likelihood of a well blowout, causing
harm to petroleum facilities and those who work on these facilities.
150 Id. at 595–96.
151 BORTHWICK, supra note 19, at 17.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 18.
154 Id.
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The current offshore petroleum regulatory system in Australia’s
waters developed in response to the Varanus and Montara incidents has
not addressed the fundamental issues identified as a root problem in Aus-
tralian petroleum regulation, namely, the horizontal and vertical inte-
gration of the regulation of petroleum activities. Certainly, the possibility
of establishing a single regulator was difficult, given the constitutional
arrangement for marine regulation in Australian Waters under the OCS.
However, the regulatory framework established in response to the risk
of CFIFs has increased the number of bodies that regulate horizontal pe-
troleum activities (i.e., across the various marine jurisdictions). Rather
than regulation occurring under the JA/DA and NOPSA arrangement in
Commonwealth Waters and state regulators regulating petroleum activi-
ties in Coastal and State Waters, there is now a mixed regulatory frame-
work across Australia’s marine jurisdiction. In Commonwealth Waters,
NOPSEMA and NOPTA regulate petroleum activities in conjunction with
the JA. In the Coastal Waters of some states and the NT, the NOPSEMA/
NOPTA/JA arrangement regulates some activities, while the states regu-
late activities in State Waters. In Western Australia, the state regulates
all activities in the Coastal Waters and State Waters.
Arguably, the regulatory reform creating a single regulator, un-
dertaken by the Commonwealth in response to the Varanus and Montara
CFIFs, has not reduced the likelihood of facility incidents that may cause
loss of life or property, since the regulatory reform has established three
Commonwealth regulators (NOPSEMA, NOPTA, and the JA), where two
regulators previously existed (NOPSA and the JA/DA). In addition, prior
to the regulatory reform, the DA regulated day-to-day activities in State,
Coastal, and Commonwealth Waters (since the JA/DA arrangement
effectively made the DA the de facto regulator), and NOPSA regulated
safety in Commonwealth Waters, at the very least. Now, State and Coastal
Waters are regulated by the State agency (who was also the DA), while
Commonwealth Waters are regulated by NOPTA, NOPSEMA, and the
JA. This disjuncture means that, under the current framework, the
horizontal regulation of petroleum activities is split between multiple
bodies—the very scenarios that multiple reports have aimed to minimize.
Whether such regulatory reform has reduced the likelihood of
further facility incidents remains to be seen. Given that the NOPSEMA/
NOPTA/JA framework has been in force for two years, it is premature to
draw conclusions. Instead, it is prudent to observe the operation of the
newly implemented regulatory framework in order to determine whether
the legislative changes are an appropriate response to reduce the likeli-
hood of facility incidents during Australian offshore petroleum activities.
